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Abstract 
 
This paper aims to address some methodological issues related to case-based research 
in the philosophy of contemporary sciences. We focus on the selection processes by 
which philosophers pick or generate a particular set of papers to conduct their case-
based research. We illustrate how to use various quantitative and qualitative methods 
to improve the epistemic features of the selection processes, and help generate some 
potential case-based hypotheses for further philosophical investigation. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper aims to address some methodological issues related to case-based research 
in the philosophy of contemporary sciences. Methodological issues regarding case-
based research have been well-discussed among social scientists, but historians and 
philosophers of science have paid less attention to them (Morgan 2019). Recently, 
some have addressed methodological issues encountered by historians and 
philosophers of science doing case-based research (Chang 2012; Morgan 2012, 2014 
and 2019; Ankeny 2007, 2011 and 2014; Pietsch 2016; Currie 2015). Among them, 
the most discussed methodological issue concerns how knowledge generated from a 
single case can be generalized or transferred to new sites. However, in this body of 
literature, less attention is paid to how philosophers of contemporary sciences pick or 
generate a particular set of papers to begin their case-based research. Presumably, 
there is some selection process through which a set of papers is selected as the starting 
point for their case-based investigation. But there is very little philosophical 
discussion about the epistemic features of this selection process.  
 
 To see the problem within the context of the philosophy of contemporary 
sciences, let’s compare the following two situations. If you want to get started on a 
scientific case regarding the Chemical Revolution, it’s relatively clear how to get 
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started. One way to go about it is to read some of the recent secondary literature, and 
then read some of the primary literature cited in that secondary literature. But if you 
want to get started on a contemporary scientific case, you may not be able to follow 
the same procedure, i.e., if there is no secondary literature. Thus, depending on one’s 
target field/period and research questions, sometimes it is obvious which set of work 
is the starting point for case-based investigation, and sometimes it is not. Temporal 
differences between the two sorts of situations are also important. The Chemical 
Revolution happened over 200 years ago, and the set of primary sources that you 
would have to examine is relatively fixed at this point. Although scholars may 
disagree about various issues, there is some consensus regarding how to characterize 
this event, its historical significance, and its aftermath. However, ongoing research in 
the contemporary sciences is (obviously) ongoing. It is therefore unclear what the 
historical significance of this work will be. So without the benefit of hindsight, how 
do philosophers of contemporary sciences choose the primary source material in this 
kind of case? Moreover, philosophers of contemporary sciences face another difficult 
challenge regarding the large number of scholarly papers in a given contemporary 
scientific field. It is quite often the case that if one searches some keyword in a 
database, it returns more than 10,000 relevant papers. In such a case, it is not possible 
to read through all the papers and judge which papers are more relevant or provide 
more useful information than the others in the database. Even if one were to read all 
the papers, the result of the analysis might not be robust across different readers due 
to interpretative differences. Philosophers of contemporary sciences certainly need 
some strategies and tools to handle large bodies of literature without the benefit of 
hindsight. There are obviously many strategies and tools one can use to select some 
papers from the database and ignore others, and it is philosophically important to ask 
how philosophers justify their selection of papers. Why is it that a particular set of 
papers, and not some other set, is selected as the starting point of a particular case-
based investigation? Is the result of a given selection process robust across different 
individuals? What relationship does this set of papers bear to the targeted body of 
literature and research question? These questions are examples of the types of 
questions we aim to raise regarding the epistemic features of the selection processes. 
 
 In this paper, we aim to address this neglected issue concerning how 
philosophers of contemporary sciences select a set of papers to conduct their case-
based research. Our strategy is to illustrate how quantitative and qualitative methods 
can help philosophers improve the quality of the selection processes and the ways in 
which they develop philosophical accounts of their targeted cases. We adopt 
Morgan’s (2012) characterization of case study (or case-based) research. According to 
her, case study research is a type of epistemic genre, i.e., a way of doing science, that 
offers a generic way of studying a whole event, episode, or situation within its own 
context. Moreover, case-based research can be conducted by employing various 
methods, such as survey methods, ethnographic methods, statistical methods, and 
historical methods. Morgan’s characterization helps us to clarify our methodological 
goal in this paper. We aim to illustrate three existing quantitative methods: citation 
analysis, classification analysis, and text analysis; and a practice-based approach to 
qualitative methods, i.e., using scientific practices as units of analysis for various 
types of qualitative methods, which we illustrate in terms of a method for performing 
literature review. The goal is to show how they can improve the ways in which 
philosophers conduct their case-based research. Specifically, we aim to show how the 
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methods and the approach can improve the epistemic features of the selection 
processes.1  
 
 Having positioned our paper in terms of the literature on case-based research 
within the philosophy of contemporary sciences, here are four more specific ways to 
state our goals in this paper. Our paper will show how to  
 
1. robustly identify non-transparent patterns regarding a large body of 
literature by using existing quantitative methods, 
2. justify the selection of a set of papers based on the identified patterns, 
3. further analyze the relationship between the selected paper(s) and the 
identified patterns and generate research questions by using a practice-based 
literature review, and 
4. use the quantitative and qualitative results to generate potential hypotheses. 
 
The quantitative methods here involve using various computational tools to perform a 
large-scale literature analysis. This kind of analysis helps us identify non-transparent 
patterns in a given body of literature in the sense that the patterns are not easily 
discernible by a traditional close-reading method. Moreover, the patterns are 
identified in a robust way in the sense that, given the same dataset and the same 
computational procedure, the result of the quantitative analysis is the same regardless 
who performs it. The practice-based approach to qualitative methods here involves 
using scientific practices as units of analysis when one is employing some type of 
qualitative method. This approach is inspired by the recent practice-turn in the 
philosophy of science.2 Proponents of this approach take scientific practices as their 
units of analysis when addressing philosophical questions. Scientific practices are 
activities performed by scientists in order to achieve certain goals. The practice-based 
approach thus focuses philosophers’ attention on the relationships that obtain among 
three things: scientists, their activities, and their goals (Chang 2011). The practice-
based approach aims to correct the default tendency among some philosophers of 
science, which is to focus almost exclusively on theories as the relevant units of 
analysis and pay less attention to, or even ignore, issues concerning scientists’ goals 
and activities. The inadequacy of this tendency has been shown to impede 
philosophers’ understanding of the relevant philosophical issues and debates.3 
 
 In the following, we illustrate how philosophers can use existing quantitative 
methods and the practice-based approach to analyze the heart-rate variability (HRV) 
field and select a set of papers for their case-based research. To that end, the paper 
will proceed as follows. In Section 2, we show how to use three quantitative methods 
and present three sets of data: one from citation analysis, one from classification 
analysis, and one from text analysis using word frequency analysis. Based on these 
 
1 It is important to note that we do not aim to propose original scientific methods for doing 
scientometric or bibliometric analysis. 
2 See Soler, Zwart, Lynch, and Israel-Jost (2014) for a recent edited collection regarding this approach. 
3 Examples of such issues and debates include: how reductionistic research strategies actually work in 
biology (Wimsatt 2006), how scientists perform modeling and use models (Giere 1988), how biologists 
use the molecular concept of gene (Waters 2014), how the metaphysical issues of individuation and 
individuality are connected to various sciences (Bueno, Chen, and Fagan 2018), and how Kuhn himself 
moved away from the novel contributions he made in his seminal book The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (Shan 2020). 
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three sets of data, we identify a key review article and a significant relationship 
between the publication of this review article and the subsequent quantitative and 
qualitative development of HRV research. In Section 3, we show how to use the 
practice-based approach to analyze the review article and argue that its main 
achievement is standardization. In Section 4, we demonstrate how to generate some 
potential hypotheses based on the quantitative and qualitative results. In Section 5, we 
conclude that the quantitative methods and the practice-based approach to qualitative 
methods can improve the quality of the selection processes for philosophers doing 
case-based research. 
 
2. Illustrating Three Quantitative Methods 
 
In this section and the next section, we will illustrate how to apply some existing 
quantitative methods and the practice-based approach to a specific biomedical field 
and how the applications improve the quality of the selection processes. This strategy 
helps us to illustrate how we achieve the four goals listed in Section 1. Before we go 
into the details, we will first introduce our target research topic, biomedical field, 
period, and body of literature, all of which center on the study of a physiological 
phenomenon called heart-rate variability (HRV) and its clinical and non-clinical 
applications. HRV refers to “the oscillation in the interval between consecutive heart 
beats as well as the oscillations between consecutive instantaneous heart rates” (Task 
Force of the European Society of Cardiology and the North American Society of 
Pacing and Electrophysiology 1996, p. 354). It is worth noting that HRV is a 
physiological phenomenon that is about variations of the intervals that are constituted 
by heart beats or heart rates, not about heart rates per se. The clinical relevance of 
HRV was first reported in Hon and Lee’s (1963) investigation of fetal distress. Since 
then, many researchers have recognized HRV’s potential in clinical and non-clinical 
applications. For example, scientists found reliable experimental evidence to support 
the correlation between a propensity for lethal heart arrhythmias and signs of 
autonomic nervous activity, e.g., increased sympathetic activity or reduced vagal 
activity (Lown and Verrier 1976; Corr, Yamada, and Witkowski 1986; Schwartz and 
Priori 1990; Levy and Schwartz 1994). Measuring HRV is considered to be a 
promising way of observing how the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous 
systems interact with each other (Rajendra Acharya et al. 2006, p. 1031). Scientists 
have been working on developing HRV as quantitative markers of autonomic activity 
in order to predict cardiovascular and other types of diseases (Kleiger, Miller, Bigger, 
and Moss 1987; Malik, Farrell, Cripps, and Camm 1989; Bigger et al. 1992). 
 
 Imagine now that you are unfamiliar with the HRV field and aim to develop 
some case-based research from this field to address some philosophical issues. What 
are the difficulties you will encounter when you are attempting to justify your 
selection of a particular set of papers as your starting point? Where and how do you 
begin your analysis? You could ask some HRV scientists about important papers in 
the field, but you might get different answers from different scientists. How do you 
evaluate these different opinions? You could pick all the review articles in the field, 
but you might not be able to evaluate their influences on the field by just reading the 
review articles. How do you show the connections between the review articles and all 
the other papers in the field? You could just pick some highly cited papers in the field, 
but you need to show what the highly cited papers mean to the field. These are 
examples of the difficulties philosophers might face when they are attempting to 
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justify their selection of some HRV papers as the starting point of their case-based 
investigation. In this section, we aim to show that using existing quantitative methods 
can generate robust quantitative reasons to justify one’s selection of some papers and 
thus address some of the above difficulties. 
 
 The quantitative methods in this section involve using a database and 
computational tools for doing literature analysis. Databases and computational tools 
are very useful in this regard. We can search for all of the articles relevant to HRV 
and perform different quantitative analyses on them. Of course, there are many 
available databases and tools one can use. We do not think there is only one 
legitimate way to conduct quantitative analyses on the relevant body of literature for 
philosophical purposes. What really matters, philosophically, is how one uses existing 
databases and tools to robustly identify non-transparent patterns from quantitative 
analyses, and use the identified patterns to justify one’s selection of a particular set of 
papers. Hence, we focus on the epistemic features of this selection process, and in this 
section, we aim to make a methodological contribution by supporting the following 
two claims. First, using these quantitative methods increases the robustness of the 
selection process. This robustness can be characterized in terms of what Leonelli 
(2018) calls computational replicability, which is the property of “being able to obtain 
the same outcomes when running a given dataset through the same algorithms” (p. 
135). Second, these quantitative methods can also generate reasons for justifying 
one’s selection of a set of papers based on the identified robust patterns in a body of 
literature. 
 
2.1 First Quantitative Method: Citation Analysis 
 
2.1.1 Method 
 
We queried Web of Science on August 7, 2017 with ‘heart rate variability’ (without 
quotation marks),4 collected papers published between 1970 and 2016 (articles 
assigned to an issue of a journal, not including articles published online first without 
being assigned to an issue of a journal), and exported the results as a Microsoft Excel 
file. We chose Web of Science because it has citation information; and because, in 
contrast to Scopus, it covers articles published before 1995 (Falagas, Pitsouni, 
Malietzis, and Pappas 2008). We then manually selected articles on HRV research 
that satisfy the following threshold of an article’s average number of citations per 
year: 
 
Total citation number 
           __________________________   ≥ 11 
 
2017 — year of publication 
 
 
The threshold 11 is determined by the following two considerations. First, we want 
the resulting sample size to be an adequate size, i.e., not too small to miss influential 
papers, but not too big to include papers that are only cited a few times. Second, after 
 
4 Please see Section 3, footnote 8 for our explanation of why we queried ‘heart rate variability’ without 
quotation marks. 
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trying different thresholds, we found that the threshold 11 provides the most 
informative visualization (see Figure 1 and Section 2.1.2 for more details). 
 
2.1.2 Results 
 
Using this method, we arrived at a list of 40 highly cited articles. Among them are 25 
original research articles, numbered as OA-1, OA-2, OA-3, and so on; and 15 review 
articles, numbered as RA-1, RA-2, RA-3, and so on. Figure 1 contains two graphs that 
show the number of citations of all 40 articles. The top graph in Figure 1 shows the 
quantitative differences in citation number between the 25 original research articles 
and RA-11. The bottom graph in Figure 1 shows the quantitative differences in 
citation number between RA-11 and the other 14 review articles. In both graphs, there 
are three rough patterns: (1) a cluster of papers with low threshold, (2) a cluster of 
papers with medium threshold, and (3) the fact that RA-11 stands out regardless of 
whether it is plotted against all the original articles (the top graph) or all the review 
articles (the bottom graph). 
 
 RA-11 is the review article titled “Heart rate variability: Standards of 
measurement, physiological interpretation, and clinical use,” authored by the Task 
Force of the European Society of Cardiology and the North American Society of 
Pacing and Electrophysiology.5 It is cited 6460 times and is the most cited article on 
our list. As Figure 1 shows, RA-11 is cited much more than other highly cited original 
research and review articles.  
 
 
5 We will use ‘Task Force 1996’ in subsequent citations to this article. 
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Fig. 1 Number of citations of the 25 original articles and RA-11 (top) and of 
the 15 review articles (bottom). Fig. 1 shows that RA-11 is cited significantly 
more compared to both the original research articles and the rest of the review 
articles  
 
 It is important to acknowledge the limitations of this method and of the 
information provided by citation number. But at the very least, this quantitative 
information gives us a starting point for further philosophical analysis because it is 
based on screening all the relevant papers in a given database. The purpose of this 
citation analysis is to provide non-arbitrary quantitative reasons to guide philosophers 
through the process of selecting some papers as the starting point of their case-based 
investigation. In the following subsections, we report the results of two additional 
analyses to reveal more quantitative and qualitative information about the 
development of the HRV field in relation to RA-11, specifically before and after 
1996, the year RA-11 was published. 
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 2.2 Second Quantitative Method: Classification Analysis 
 
2.2.1 Method 
 
We queried PubMed on May 12, 2017 with ‘heart rate variability’ (without quotation 
marks),6 collected papers published between 1970 and 2016 (articles assigned to an 
issue of a journal, not including articles published online first without being assigned 
to an issue of a journal), exported the results as a Microsoft Excel file, and manually 
deleted papers not related to HRV research and duplicate records. This process 
resulted in 19,795 articles. We chose PubMed because its keyword searching function 
offers optimal update frequency (Falagas, Pitsouni, Malietzis, and Pappas 2008). We 
then manually classified these 19,795 articles into one of the following three 
categories: (A) foundational research on relevant mechanisms or technological 
advances, (B) correlation to cardiovascular disease, and (C) correlation to non-
cardiovascular disease. The classification was done by an HRV expert based on the 
titles of the articles. When the title of an article was insufficient for him to make a 
judgment, he read the abstract or main text to make the judgment. 
 
2.2.2 Results 
 
Figure 2 shows the percentage of each type of article in every thousand articles 
arranged chronologically. The results show that, before RA-11 was published in 1996, 
the percentage of category A research decreased and then increased, the percentage of 
category B research was increasing, and the percentage of category C research was 
decreasing. After RA-11 was published in 1996, these trends changed. The percentage 
of category C articles increased rapidly between 1996 and 2001, and has remained 
above 60% since 2001. The percentages of category A and B articles, by contrast, 
steadily decreased between 1996 and 2001, and since 2001 have remained less than 
10% for category A, and roughly between 15% and 25% for category B. Thus, Figure 
2 shows that the HRV field transformed in both quantitative and qualitative ways after 
the publication of RA-11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Please see Section 3, footnote 8 for our explanation of why we queried ‘heart rate variability’ without 
quotation marks. 
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Fig. 2 Percentages of articles in each of the three categories per group of 
one thousand articles, arranged chronologically 
 
2.3 Third Quantitative Method: Text Analysis 
 
2.3.1 Method 
 
Text analysis can create sets of structured data out of heaps of unstructured text. One 
can then employ text analytics, which involves a set of computational techniques, to 
analyze the data in order to derive valuable information and discover patterns. 
Specifically, we calculated the frequency of each word in all the titles of the 19,795 
articles used in our classification analysis. The most frequent words discovered herein 
were then highlighted by word clouds to provide insightful visualization (Felix, 
Franconeri, and Bertini 2017). Some might worry about the limitations of analyzing 
papers’ titles only (Borgerson 2009). This is why we use the text analysis of article 
titles to provide an independent way of confirming the results of the classification 
analysis in Section 2.2, not to directly infer something from the analysis of titles 
alone. Also, we focused on a text analysis of titles because titles often indicate the 
topic of a paper, and because our purpose was to identify how the research topics 
evolved between 1970 and 2016. We did not aim to perform any finer-grained 
analyses regarding the contents of the papers. We plotted the five most frequent 
words in every thousand articles arranged chronologically. The text size in Figure 3 
reflects the absolute frequency of occurrence of each word. 
 
2.3.2 Results 
 
Figure 3 shows that, before RA-11 was published, the most frequent words included 
fetal, ventricular, spectral, myocardial, and infarction. Between 1996 and 2001, sleep 
starts showing up. After 2001, exercise, sleep, and stress became the three most 
frequent words. Exercise, sleep, and stress are three important topics in the clinical 
applications of HRV. This shows that, after RA-11 was published, the HRV field 
shifted its main research focus toward clinical applications. This shift is consistent 
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with what our second set of data shows: Between 1996 and 2001, the percentage of 
category C research rapidly increased, and after 2001, it consistently remained above 
60%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 The five most frequent words in the article titles of every thousand 
articles, arranged chronologically 
 
2.4 Discussion of the Results 
 
To sum up, our first set of data shows that RA-11 is the most cited article in the field. 
Our second set of data shows the quantitative and qualitative development of HRV 
research before and after RA-11 was published in 1996. Our third set of data shows a 
pattern of development that is consistent with our second set of data. Based on these 
three sets of quantitative data, we can justify using RA-11 as the starting point of our 
case-based research and investigate the following research question (which is also 
generated from the three datasets): Why did the HRV field exhibit the identified 
quantitative and qualitative changes after RA-11 was published in 1996? 
 
 In the subsections above, we have shown how quantitative methods can help 
philosophers to identify an intriguing correlation between RA-11 and a specific 
pattern of change in the HRV field, especially the flourishing and steady output of 
category C research. By doing so, we aim to provide support for the following two 
points. 
 
 The first point concerns how philosophers can robustly identify non-
transparent patterns in the literature. Note that the identified correlation and pattern of 
change would not be transparent to those who use a traditional close-reading method. 
Moreover, the citation analysis and the text analysis methods provide a strong degree 
of robustness for this particular selection process because of the degree of 
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computational replicability they achieve. That is, by using the same dataset and the 
same computational procedure, different scholars are very likely to produce the same 
quantitative results. Of course, our classification analysis may not yield the highest 
possible degree of robustness for the selection process because it was done manually 
rather than following a computational procedure. However, we do not aim to argue 
that our approach provides the strongest degree of robustness for the selection 
process. There are obviously other ways of performing quantitative analyses, and they 
might achieve a degree of robustness in this particular case that is higher than what 
we have shown. The point we aim to make here is that using quantitative methods can 
provide some degree of robustness for the selection process because of the degree of 
computational replicability they can achieve. Philosophers of contemporary sciences 
can improve the quality of their selection process by establishing some degree of 
robustness for their selection process.  
 
 The second point concerns how philosophers can generate verifiable and non-
private reasons to justify their selection processes. We have shown that philosophers 
can cite the identified non-transparent patterns as reasons to support their choice of a 
set of papers, as we have done with RA-11. These reasons are verifiable in the sense 
that different people can run the same dataset with the same computational procedure 
to verify whether they get the same result. These reasons are also non-private in the 
sense that they are not based on scientists’ common sense or intuition. That said, it is 
often the case that an experienced scientist does have some good sense or intuition 
about how other scientists in her communities perform their research. For example, it 
might strike her to be obvious, or even trivial, that the review work done by a task 
force has a strong influence on the field. She might think this is just how science 
works. However, in order to justify their selection processes, philosophers of science 
are expected to provide reasons that enable them to engage in the social process of 
argumentation with other philosophers. These reasons function as epistemic objects 
that other philosophers can examine, verify, challenge, or revise when they examine 
whether or not a given selection process is really a good one for addressing a specific 
research question. An experienced scientist’s common sense or intuition certainly can 
provide good insights for philosophers. But common sense and intuition cannot 
perform the epistemic role played by verifiable and non-private reasons in the social 
process of argumentation. Thus, a selection process grounded on verifiable and non-
private reasons is much better than one grounded on a scientist’s common sense or 
intuition. 
 
 By using these quantitative methods, we are able to identify an intriguing 
correlation between RA-11 and the specific pattern of change in the HRV field. 
Without the above quantitative analyses, we, as philosophers, cannot robustly identify 
non-transparent patterns in the literature and justify our selection of RA-11 with 
evidence-based, quantitative reasons that can be subject to further empirical 
examination.  
 
 It is perhaps worth noting at this point that it is not the aim of the quantitative 
methods we employ to yield a fine-grained analysis of the practices or claims in any 
specific article. To be sure, this detailed, content-based type of analysis plays an 
important role in our approach. But it does so only after we have used the quantitative 
methods to identify important patterns in the literature, generate our research 
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question, and justify why a particular set of papers can be used as a foundation for our 
case study. 
 
3. Illustrating a Practice-Based Approach to Qualitative Methods 
 
However, at this point, we do not have an in-depth understanding of why this 
correlation holds, what RA-11 means to the field, or how to use our knowledge of this 
correlation for further investigation. This is where the practice-based approach to 
qualitative methods comes in. It is important to note that, because of the quantitative 
analyses we have reported in Section 2, we are able to focus our attention on RA-11 
and its relationship to the rest of the papers in the field. Without the guidance from the 
quantitative analyses, we would not know where to apply the practice-based approach 
to subsequent qualitative analysis.  
 
 As we have mentioned earlier, the practice-based approach is inspired by the 
recent practice-turn in the philosophy of science. The key feature of the practice-
based approach is to use scientific practices as the units of analysis. Scientific 
practices are activities that are performed by scientists in order to achieve certain 
goals (Chang 2011). In order to understand scientific practices, it is therefore 
important to understand the relationships that hold among scientists, their activities, 
and their goals. In this section, we aim to apply the practice-based approach to our 
qualitative analysis of the content of RA-11. Specifically, we have two goals. First, 
we will use scientific practices as our units of analysis to analyze what the task force 
accomplished. We will identify the goals that the members of the task force set for 
themselves. Identifying these goals will help us to identify the activities they 
performed in order to achieve the goals. Second, we will analyze how the 
accomplishments of the task force relate to the subsequent patterns of change in the 
field. It is important to note that we are able to specify the above two goals to further 
our case-based investigation because we have used the above quantitative analyses to 
justify our selection of RA-11 and identify the correlation between RA-11 and the 
subsequent patterns of change in the field.  
 
 The task force states five goals they aim to achieve: “standardize 
nomenclature and develop definitions of terms; specify standard methods of 
measurement; define physiological and pathophysiological correlates; describe 
currently appropriate clinical applications, and identify areas for future research” 
(Task Force 1996, p. 354).7 In 1996, the task force published their results as the 
review article labeled as RA-11 in Figure 1. In what follows, we will first review the 
relevant details about how the task force achieved each goal, and then show that many 
of the scientific activities the task force performed involved standardization. 
 
 The first goal of RA-11 is to standardize nomenclature. Before RA-11 was 
published, many terms were used to refer to the phenomenon of interest, i.e., 
variations of the intervals between consecutive heart beats or consecutive 
instantaneous heart rates. For example, terms like ‘cycle length variability,’ ‘heart 
 
7 Citations in the remainder of this section will be to Task Force (1996), and will only include the page 
number. 
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period variability,’ ‘RR variability,’ and ‘RR interval tachogram’ were used (p. 354).8 
When compared with ‘heart rate variability,’ these terms better convey the fact that 
the target of analysis is variations of the intervals, not heart rate per se. Nonetheless, 
the term ‘heart rate variability’ gained popularity over other terms. RA-11 thus adopts 
the term ‘heart-rate variability’ and standardizes its definition as “the oscillation in the 
interval between consecutive heart beats as well as the oscillations between 
consecutive instantaneous heart rates” (p. 354). In addition to standardizing the term 
used to describe the phenomenon under investigation, they also standardize other 
related technical terms in the context of standardizing methods of measurement and 
clinical applications, which we will turn to now. 
 
 The second goal of RA-11 is to standardize methods of measurement. Out of 
the 22 pages of the main text, the part of the article devoted to standardizing 
measurement methods takes up 10 pages, almost 50% of the article. At the very least, 
this shows that the task force judged that it was important to devote more space in the 
article to standardizing measurement methods than to other issues.9 In RA-11, the task 
force discusses various methods for measuring HRV, including time domain methods, 
frequency domain methods, rhythm pattern analysis, and non-linear methods. They 
standardize time domain methods (p. 358, Table 1) and frequency domain methods (p. 
360, Table 2), and specify how to correlate these two kinds of measures (p. 362, Table 
3). They also emphasize the value of rhythm pattern analysis, specify the appropriate 
situations for using it, and recommend using it when it is appropriate. But they don’t 
recommend using non-linear methods on the grounds that more systematic studies are 
still needed in order to assess these methods. In addition to standardizing methods for 
measuring HRV, the task force also specifies recording requirements when collecting 
data for HRV analysis, especially when using commercial equipment to do so. They 
also standardize the procedure of recording and processing signals from 
electrocardiography (p. 365, Figure 7). The standardizing work of the task force 
established practical standards for HRV researchers. By adopting these standards, 
researchers could conduct their research on the same common ground, more or less. 
This in turn made fruitful comparisons and competitions possible and sustainable. 
 
 The third goal of RA-11 is to specify physiological correlates of HRV 
components and pathophysiological correlates of changes of HRV. The task force 
reviews the literature on the relevant mechanistic details (pp. 365-66). And they 
recommend using a frequency domain method to interpret the high frequency 
component of HRV (HF) as correlating with vagal activity in the autonomic nervous 
system. They note the disagreement regarding how to interpret the low frequency 
component of HRV (LF). Some correlate LF with sympathetic modulations, while 
others correlate it with both sympathetic and vagal activity. Different interpretations 
of LF thus lead to different interpretations of the correlate of the LF/HF ratio. The 
task force notes the disagreement and recommends doing further work to clarify the 
 
8 Because of these terminological variations, we intentionally queried the databases with the term 
‘heart rate variability’ without quotation marks, so that we could include papers that use terms like 
‘cycle length variability,’ ‘heart period variability,’ and ‘RR variability.’ However, because we did not 
use quotation marks, our results included papers that contain the terms ‘heart,’ ‘rate,’ or ‘variability,’ 
but are not related to HRV research. We then manually deleted these irrelevant papers. 
9 Incidentally, the fact that the task force didn’t concern itself with proposing a central theory to guide 
future HRV research shows that our practice-based approach is appropriate, and that it would be 
misguided to adopt some sort of theory-based approach for analyzing this article. 
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physiological correlate of LF. They also specify five pathophysiological correlates of 
five types of changes of HRV (pp. 366-67). One of them concerns mental stress, 
which is one of the most frequent words after 2001 in Figure 3. They also review five 
interventions that can modify HRV. But they note that it is problematic to assume that 
modifying HRV can protect patients from cardiac mortality and sudden cardiac death, 
and that more research is still needed on this issue (pp. 367-68). 
 
 The fourth goal of RA-11 is to describe the clinical applications of HRV that 
the task force considered appropriate at the time. The task force states that, though 
there had been many attempts to use HRV to investigate cardiological and non-
cardiological diseases and other clinical conditions, only two clinical applications 
were widely accepted by the HRV community. One is to predict the risk of mortality 
after acute myocardial infarction. The other is to assess early warning signs of 
diabetic neuropathy. The task force then standardizes the relevant measures of HRV 
suitable for the two clinical applications and specifies how to use them (pp. 368-371). 
They also summarize a set of studies that apply HRV to cardiological conditions other 
than myocardial infarction and note their potential without doing any standardizing 
work regarding these applications (pp. 372-373). 
 
 The fifth goal of RA-11 is to identify areas for future research. The task force 
points out what work needs to be done in order to improve HRV measurement and 
our understanding of the physiological correlates of HRV. They also point to various 
possibilities of future clinical utility, specifically about sleep and exercise (p. 347), 
which are two of the most frequent words after 2001 in Figure 3. 
 
 Based on the above, it is clear that the task force carried out a great amount of 
standardizing work. They standardized the nomenclature regarding HRV, methods for 
measuring HRV, procedures for recording and processing HRV signals, and 
procedures and methods for measuring HRV for the two clinical applications 
discussed above. The other achievements of RA-11 are either implications of this 
standardizing work or complementary to it. For example, the future research 
possibilities are suggested based on what was left unaddressed or insufficiently 
addressed after the standardizing work had been completed. 
  
 To recap: The HRV field has undergone significant quantitative and 
qualitative changes since the publication of RA-11. Moreover, RA-11 is the most 
cited article in the field, and the task force that published RA-11 undertook various 
types of standardizing work. Given all of that, how do we understand the relationship 
between the standardization achievements of this heavily cited article and the 
subsequent changes in the field?  
 
4. Using Case Study Methods to Generate Hypotheses 
 
In this section, we will illustrate how the above question can guide philosophers to 
formulate potential hypotheses to inform further case-based investigation. We will 
show what a potential hypothesis would look like and how it could be developed in 
terms of the case-based understanding generated through the quantitative and 
qualitative results from the previous two sections. It is important to note that we do 
not aim to directly argue for the validity of the hypothesis in this paper since the 
evidence we have provided in this paper is obviously not sufficient to substantiate the 
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validity claim. What we aim to show is the potential of our quantitative methods and 
the practice-based approach for doing case-based research in the philosophy of 
science, specifically, how they can help philosophers generate potential hypotheses 
for further case-based investigation. 
 
 In the remainder of the section, we will elaborate one potential hypothesis 
regarding the relationship between the standardization achievements of RA-11 and 
the subsequent changes in the field. We develop this hypothesis in terms of the 
concept of exemplar (Kuhn 1970; Rouse 2002; Shan 2020). It is worth emphasizing 
that the concept of exemplar we will use has been expanded to go beyond Kuhn’s 
original articulation of that concept, and we do not aim to defend the whole package 
of Kuhn’s work here. Our goal here is to use the concept of exemplar to show how it 
helps generate a hypothesis. Having shown that, we will discuss some limitations of 
this potential hypothesis, specifically, that it cannot provide the whole story regarding 
the targeted relationship. We will briefly indicate how other concepts, e.g., the 
concept of repertoire (Ankeny and Leonelli 2016), might be useful to probe other 
aspects of the relationship. 
 
 4.1 Exemplars 
 
Kuhn originally introduced exemplars as “accepted examples of actual scientific 
practice—examples which include law, theory, application, and instrumentation 
together—[that] provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of 
scientific research” (1970, p. 10). Kuhn himself stated explicitly that the concept of 
exemplar is “the central element of what I now take to be the most novel and least 
understood aspect of this book,” namely, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
(Kuhn 1970, p. 187). Kuhn’s articulation of the notion of an exemplar is strongly 
practice-oriented. An exemplar is not merely an accepted theory within a research 
community, but a multi-dimensional entity that includes non-theoretical aspects of 
practices as well. 
 
 Both Rouse (2002) and Shan (2020) articulate and expand upon Kuhn’s 
original concept of exemplar and propose to use it to analyze the history of scientific 
practice. Rouse (2002) articulates and expands upon these non-theoretical aspects by 
emphasizing that accepting exemplars amounts to mastering “exemplary ways of 
conceptualizing and intervening in particular situations” (2002, p. 107). He lists some 
typical skills acquired through accepting an exemplar: (1) applying concepts to 
specific situations; (2) deploying mathematical tools, applying them correctly to the 
situation at hand, knowing their limitations, and knowing ways to circumvent those 
limitations; (3) using instrumental and experimental techniques and procedures; and 
(4) recognizing significant opportunities to extend these skills to new situations that 
can extend the research potential of an exemplar (Rouse 2002, pp. 107-108).  
 
 Similarly, Shan (2020) also articulates and expands upon the non-theoretical 
aspects of exemplars. Kuhn had also introduced exemplars as “concrete problem-
solutions” that “show [scientists] by example how their job is to be done” (1970, p. 
187). But, as Shan points out (2020, pp. 389-90), though Kuhn’s original 
characterization of exemplar is richer than merely taking exemplars as problem-
solutions, he didn’t further articulate exemplars sufficiently. Shan thinks the practice 
of defining research problems is just as important as the practice of puzzle-solving, 
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and often the two are intertwined activities (2020, p. 391). Because of this, he sees the 
need to expand Kuhn’s concept of exemplar to include, not just a set of problem 
solutions, but also the practice of defining research problems. Thus, for Shan, an 
exemplar is a set of problems and their solutions, which contains vocabulary, practical 
guides, hypotheses, and patterns of reasoning (2020, p. 392). 
 
 We think that Rouse’s and Shan’s expanded articulations of the notion of an 
exemplar are two different ways of characterizing the same thing. Rouse focuses more 
on characterizing various practices that constitute an exemplar, whereas Shan focuses 
more on elaborating how the practice of defining research problems is intertwined 
with the practice of puzzle-solving within the context of other practices that constitute 
an exemplar. In the following subsection, we make use of Rouse’s and Shan’s work 
on the concept of exemplar and propose our hypothesis regarding the relationship 
between the standardization achievements of RA-11 and the subsequent changes in 
the HRV field. 
 
 4.2 An Exemplar-Based Hypothesis  
 
Recall that the task force (1) defines how to apply terms and concepts in specific 
situations, (2) specifies the standards for methods of measuring HRV, (3) outlines 
procedures for recording and processing HRV signals, (4) specifies procedures and 
methods of measuring HRV for the two accepted clinical applications (problem-
solutions), and (5) also identifies ways of extending these skills to new research 
possibilities. 
 
 These achievements can all be subsumed under the concept of exemplar as 
both Rouse and Shan have articulated it. Rouse takes an exemplar to be constituted by 
exemplary ways of conceptualizing, recording, measuring, analyzing, and intervening. 
(1)-(5) can all be interpreted as the constituents of an exemplar in Rouse’s sense. Shan 
further articulates an important constituent of an exemplar: a set of well-defined 
research problems. Since the task force standardized many practices, especially ways 
of applying terms and concepts in specific situations, these standardized practices 
provide the common currency for formulating well-defined research problems. 
Moreover, the task force indeed points out potential clinical applications as future 
research problems for the field. 
 
 If we apply the concept of exemplar to interpret the significance of the task 
force’s standardization achievements, we can generate the following exemplar-based 
hypothesis:  
 
(Exemplar-Based Hypothesis) An exemplar was established by the task force 
that published RA-11, and RA-11 bears the identified relationship to the 
changes of the HRV field because it plays the role of an exemplar for the 
field. 
 
This hypothesis provides a potential understanding of the relationship between the 
standardization achievements of the task force and the subsequent changes in the 
field. By introducing an exemplar for the field, the task force establishes the 
exemplary ways of conceptualizing, recording, measuring, analyzing, and intervening. 
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This can partly account for why RA-11 bears a strong correlation to the identified 
patterns of change that the HRV field exhibits.  
 
 To complicate the matter a bit, we want to introduce Morgan’s (2019) notion 
of an exemplary account of a case phenomenon. According to her, an exemplary 
account of a phenomenon is an account developed by scholars that “illuminates and 
changes the way that the community thinks about that phenomenon” (p. 2). Moreover, 
an exemplary account can be developed based on a mundane case. The relevance of 
Morgan’s notion here is that we take our exemplar-based hypothesis to be a potential 
instance of an exemplary account. Since the core of our HRV case study involves a 
review article written by a task force, one might think that this case is very mundane. 
It is expected that review articles in a scientific field influence the field in certain 
ways. This observation is fair. But we are not claiming that our HRV case itself is 
special in the sense that it reveals a novel, previously unstudied way in which review 
articles influence their fields. Instead, we aim to use the exemplar-based hypothesis to 
show how one could build a potential exemplary account of a mundane case, such as 
a review article in a biomedical field. 
 
 4.3 A Repertoire-Based Hypothesis  
 
If philosophers use the above hypothesis to guide their further research, they can 
explore more about the epistemic dimension of the relationship between the 
standardization achievements and the pattern of change in the HRV field. But it is 
also reasonable to suspect that the developmental pattern of the HRV field could also 
have been influenced by non-epistemic factors. For example, researchers in 
biomedical sciences are regularly pressured to demonstrate the practical relevance of 
their research. It could be the case that RA-11 bears the identified relationship with 
the HRV field because the task force endorses the two instances of clinical 
applications of HRV research (Task Force 1996, pp. 368-371) and the prospect of 
exploring more clinical applications (Task Force 1996, pp. 372-373). In this possible 
scenario, the need to demonstrate and pursue clinical relevance of HRV research is 
also one of the factors that shapes the subsequent pattern in the HRV field. One could 
argue that the standardization achievements as exemplars are epistemic tools the task 
force uses to guide the HRV field to develop more clinical applications based on the 
two established clinical applications before 1996.  
 
 In order to capture the above possible scenario, we will introduce Ankeny and 
Leonelli’s (2016) concept of research repertoire. Ankeny and Leonelli seek to frame 
scientific change in terms of administrative, material, technological, and institutional 
innovations, not merely in terms of theoretical innovations. They also seek to track 
the development of research practices in a given discipline without using the concepts 
of paradigm shift and scientific revolution. They thus propose the concept of a 
research repertoire. In a way, they take their concept of a research repertoire to be 
similar to Kuhn’s concept of an exemplar (p. 20), but they include social, institutional, 
and economic features that one does not find in Kuhn’s concept of exemplar. 
 
 This concept places more emphasis on the non-epistemic conditions in which 
a certain research style is established, evolves, becomes entrenched, or is transferred. 
The concept is a performative concept in the sense that it aims to capture the skills 
that are required to produce the relevant products and the products themselves. With 
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respect to the skill aspect, Ankeny and Leonelli emphasize the importance of looking 
into performative, social, financial, and organizational conditions in which a certain 
style of performing research is established, evolves, and reproduces (p. 21). They use 
the style of doing research with model organisms in biological sciences as an example 
of what a research repertoire is. They argue that the use of model organisms arises 
mainly because the proponents of this research style are able to convince their peers 
and large-scale government funders that this style of research provides critical 
opportunities for sharing knowledge, materials, and technologies across different 
biological research groups (Ankeny and Leonelli 2011). They aim to use this case to 
show that some non-epistemic conditions are critical for establishing the style of 
research using model organisms. 
 
 If we apply the concept of a research repertoire to interpret the development of 
the HRV field, we can generate the following repertoire-based hypothesis:  
 
(Repertoire-Based Hypothesis) RA-11 bears the identified relationship to the 
changes of the HRV field because the task force was able to convince their 
peers and government funders that using the standardized HRV practices 
provides critical opportunities for exploring possible clinical applications of 
HRV research. 
 
It is important to note that the exemplar-based hypothesis and the repertoire-based 
hypothesis direct philosophers to investigate different dimensions of the relationship 
between the standardization achievements of RA-11 and the HRV field. The 
exemplar-based hypothesis might capture various epistemic roles the task force plays 
and could potentially account for why RA-11 bears the identified relationship to the 
pattern of change in the field. On the other hand, the repertoire-based hypothesis 
might capture various non-epistemic roles the task force plays and could also 
potentially account for the identified relationship. Whether these two hypotheses are 
competing or complementary is an empirical issue that requires more case-based 
investigations to clarify. We acknowledge that the task force’s influence on the HRV 
field is a complex episode and hence requires multiple perspectives to investigate it. 
Perhaps approaching this complexity from different angles for different purposes is 
the best strategy for philosophers of biomedical sciences in this case. 
 
5. A Methodological Conclusion: The Illustrated Methods and Approach Can 
Improve the Quality of the Selection Process  
 
This paper addresses a neglected methodological issue in the literature on case-based 
research. The issue concerns the epistemic features of the selection process by which 
philosophers of contemporary sciences begin their case-based investigations. We 
address this issue by illustrating how quantitative methods and the practice-based 
approach to qualitative methods can help improve the quality of the selection process. 
Our illustrated quantitative methods can improve the degree of robustness of the 
selection process, and identify non-transparent patterns in a large body of literature, 
which in turn function as verifiable and non-private reasons to justify philosophers’ 
selection of a case and enable them to engage in the social process of argumentation. 
Our illustrated practice-based approach can help generate more specific research 
questions through analyzing the selected case in detail, and potential hypotheses that 
can guide further philosophical investigation regarding the selected case. We thus 
19 
recommend that philosophers of contemporary sciences employ them to epistemically 
improve their selection processes. 
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